One question I am often asked is whether an employer and carrier should seek reimbursement pursuant to the War Hazards Compensation Act (“WHCA”), see 42 U.S.C. § 1704, or file an appeal with the Benefits Review Board, see 33 U.S.C. § 921. This question arises after an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) finds the employer and carrier liable for benefits in a contested claim that involved alleged “war-risk hazards.” My answer to this question is, “It depends.” In my opinion, when an ALJ issues a Decision and Order that concretely links a claimant’s injuries to “war-risk hazards,” reimbursement should be sought instead of an appeal. The Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) requires employers and carriers to litigate a Defense Base Act (“DBA”) claim as if the WHCA did not apply. See 20 C.F.R. § 61.102. They are required to (1) take advantage of any assignment or subrogation rights due to the liability of a third party;Read more
DBA Settlements Can Be Based on a Peer Review Medical Report
Claimant appealed the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who approved Claimant’s Section 8(i) settlement agreement. Claimant, a Defense Base Act employee, was injured when his weapon’s butt stock struck his breastbone, injuring his chest and ribs. He voluntarily signed a $15,000 settlement which stated that Dr. Boris Bacic examined him. Later, however, Claimant stated that he was not actually examined by Dr. Bacic. The Benefits Review Board (“BRB”) affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Interestingly, Claimant did not complain about the amount of the settlement, but instead, the fact that the settlement was not based on the opinion of an examining physician. The BRB noted that the regulations require only that the settlement contain “[a] current medical report,”and there is “no requirement that the report be from a physician who personally examined claimant.” See 20 C.F.R. § 702.242(b)(5). The statement in the settlement that Claimant was actually examined by Dr. Bacic was harmless.Read more
For Longshore Coverage Exemptions, Focus on the Site of the Injury
The Benefits Review Board (“BRB”) recently affirmed a denial of benefits to a claimant who injured his back. It was an opportunity for the BRB to address exemptions to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) granted by the Department of Labor (“DOL”). At issue was Section 3(d) of the LHWCA, and the proper focus of an exemption inquiry: (d)(1) No compensation shall be payable to an employee employed at a facility of an employer if, as certified by the Secretary, the facility is engaged in the business of building, repairing, or dismantling exclusively small vessels…unless the injury occurs while upon the navigable waters of the United States or while upon any adjoining pier, wharf, dock, facility over land for launching vessels, or facility over land for hauling, lifting, or drydocking vessels. (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), compensation shall be payable to an employee– (A) who is employed at a facility whichRead more
What is Reimbursable Under the War Hazards Compensation Act? And When is it Reimbursable?
The Defense Base Act (“DBA”) is a system of federal workers’ compensation applied to United States contractors working abroad on U.S. bases or pursuant to a U.S. contract. When these contractors sustain a work-related injury, they are entitled to benefits. In some instances, the event that caused the contractor’s injury qualifies as a “war-risk hazard.” See 42 U.S.C. 1711 and 20 C.F.R. 61.4. Generally, “war-risk hazards” include the discharge of weapons; any action by a hostile force or person, including insurrection or rebellion; the discharge of munitions intended for use in war; the collision of vessels and aircraft operating without customary navigation aids; and the operation of a vessel or aircraft in a zone of hostility or engaged in war activities. The benefits paid to a DBA claimant because of injuries caused by a “war-risk hazard” qualifies the employer, insurance carrier, or compensation fund that paid benefits to reimbursement under theRead more
SCOTUS Decided Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc.
This morning the Supreme Court decided Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc. In this employer-friendly decision, the Court held that “an employee is ‘newly awarded compensation’ when he first becomes disabled and thereby becomes statutorily entitled to benefits, no matter whether, or when, a compensation order issues on his behalf.” The Court’s syllabus is reprinted below. The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) creates a comprehensive scheme to pay compensation for an eligible employee’s disability or death resulting from injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States. Benefits for most types of disabilities are capped at twice the national average weekly wage for the fiscal year in which an injured employee is “newly awarded compensation.” 33 U. S. C. §906(c). The LHWCA requires employers to pay benefits voluntarily, without formal administrative proceedings. Typically, employers pay benefits without contesting liability, so no compensation orders are issued. However, if an employer controvertsRead more
Roberts v. Sea-Land Services Write-Up at LexisNexis’ Workers’ Compensation Community
Recently, I had the privilege of preparing an article about the oral arguments before the Supreme Court in the Roberts v. Sea-Land Services case. The article was posted on LexisNexis’ Workers Compensation Community page, and it can be found at this link. There is a healthy Longshore community over at LexisNexis, and for good reason. Here are some of the Longshore-related posts I enjoyed: LHWCA: Responsible Employer Determination in Cases Involving Multiple Traumatic Injuries: Seeking Analytical Clarity by Yelena Zaslavskaya. For those who may not have been there, Ms. Zaslavskaya’s article about attorney’s fee rates, Longshore Act: Reasonable Hourly Rate Determination — Overview of Recent Decisions, received a lot of well-deserved kudos at the 2011 Annual Longshore Conference. I expect her Responsible Employer article will receive the same. As Iraq War Winds Down, Some DBA Issues Are Resolved While Others Remain in Dispute by Mark A. Reinhalter. This article presents a helpful overview of theRead more
Prior Bad Acts Relevant to Damages and Future-Earnings Calculation
Plaintiff suffered serious on-the-job injuries when he fell from a cylindrical cell tower. Thereafter, Plaintiff and his wife sued Plaintiff’s employer, as well as other companies involved in Plaintiff’ work on the day he fell. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict that Plaintiff had not established the facts necessary to recover under the Jones Act, despite incurring nearly eleven million dollars in actual damages. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, Plaintiff complained about the admission of an expert report which contained unflattering facts about Plaintiff’s past, including “extensive prior alcohol, methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana use; a failure to pay child support and termination of his parental rights; numerous arrests for alcohol intoxication, convictions for trafficking methamphetamine, driving while impaired, possession of marijuana, and failure to appear in court; and physical abuse leading to hospitalization.” The Sixth Circuit was satisfied that the expert’s opinionRead more
Supreme Court Grants Another “Vessel” Case. Casino Boats Beware.
On February 21, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari for Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida. The issue is “[w]hether a floating structure that is indefinitely moored, receives power and other utilities from shore, and is not intended to be used in maritime transportation or commerce constitutes a “vessel” under 1 U.S.C. Sec. 3, thus triggering federal maritime jurisdiction.” SCOTUSBlog’s case page provides a wealth of case information, including the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion from which certiorari was granted. In the Eleventh Circuit, the City of Riviera Beach (“City”) filed an in rem proceeding against Defendant Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length (“Defendant”) for trespass and to foreclose on the City’s maritime lien for unpaid dockage. Defendant argued that his was a “floating residential structure” and not a “vessel,” but the Eleventh Circuit disagreed. Pursuant to 1 U.S.C. Sec. 3, a “vessel” includes “every description ofRead more
Louisiana Third Circuit Follows Suit, Holds Casino Boat Not a Vessel
An intoxicated patron fell down the stairs of the M/V CROWN CASINO, a riverboat casino owned by St. Charles Gaming Company, Inc. the plaintiff filed suit seeking damages under general maritime law which, he argued, pre-empted a Louisiana statute limiting liability for loss connected with the service of alcoholic beverages. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.1 (2012). The parties then filed cross motions as to whether the casino boat had vessel status. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit, determined that the M/V CROWN CASINO was not a vessel for maritime purposes. A “vessel” is “every description of watercraft or artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.” 1 U.S.C. § 3. The Supreme Court, in Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 125 S.Ct. 1118, 1127 (2005), determined that “a watercraft is not ‘capable of being used’ for maritime transport in any meaningful senseRead more
Section 944 Does Not Preempt New Hampshire’s Insurer Liquidation Act
The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire recently addressed an interesting Special Fund question: whether the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) preempts New Hampshire’s state law establishing the priority in which payments will be made from the assets of a liquidated insurer. The court determined that the state law was not preempted by the LHWCA. The Home Insurance Company was declared insolvent in 2003 by the New Hampshire Superior Court. Liquidation was ordered and the United States Department of Labor filed a proof of claim seeking $2,600,000.00 in Special Fund assessments. The DOL was assigned as a Class III priority, and it was believed that Class III claims would not be paid because of insufficient funds. The DOL then filed the instant suit seeking its preemption declaration. The goal was to move up to a Class I or Class II level in order to haveRead more
- « Previous Page
- 1
- …
- 28
- 29
- 30
- 31
- 32
- …
- 39
- Next Page »
