The United States Department of Labor issued a final rule implementing the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Act’s exclusion for recreational vessel workers.  The final rule, which becomes effective on January 30, 2012, excludes from the definition of “employee” those “[i]ndividuals employed to build any recreational vehicle under sixty-five feet in length, or individuals employed to repair any recreational vehicle, or to dismantle any part of a recreational vehicle in connection with the repair of such vessel….”  Further, the final rule defines the term “recreational vessel” by incorporating the United States Coast Guard’s standards for defining a recreational vehicle.  The definition focuses on the purpose of the vessel (i.e. is it used for pleasure or recreation?), but even a public vessel can be deemed recreational “at the time of repair, dismantling for repair, or dismantling, provided that such vessel shares elements of design and construction with traditional recreational vessels and isRead more

In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981), the Supreme Court defined a vessel’s duty to longshoremen, holding that the vessel owner must provide work space, equipment, and tools in a condition that allows a stevedore, acting with reasonable care, to carry on his operations with reasonable safety.  The stevedore must be warned of hidden dangers that the owner knows or should know about in the exercise of reasonable care, but the owner does not have to monitor the stevedoring operations for dangerous conditions that develop during the work relationship unless the vessel owner becomes aware of the danger.  Courts have outlined three instances where vessel owner liability may be established in favor of the longshoreman: (1) if the vessel owner fails to warn on turning over the ship of hidden defects of which he should have known; (2) for injury caused by hazards underRead more

Claimant, a mechanic charged with repairing and maintaining containers and chassis brought to his employer’s facility by shipping companies, injured his left wrist while closing a container door.  Although Claimant received Florida workers’ compensation benefits, he asserted a claim for Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act benefits.  The employer controverted on the grounds that Claimant was not a maritime employee and he was not injured on a maritime situs.  The Benefits Review Board (“Board”) determined that Claimant held sufficient status to be a maritime employee, but that he was not injured on a maritime situs.  Claimant satisfied the maritime employee status question because his “regular work involved keeping the containers in good repair for use in maritime commerce….”  The fatal flaw in Claimant’s case, however, was the location of his work place.  It is located over three miles away from the employer’s Blount Island facility.  The Board determined that Claimant’s work place doesRead more

Section 3(a) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) states: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling or building a vessel).” With that statutory language in mind, consider whether the location described below is covered by the LHWCA? “The North Yard Parking Lot is situated on the premises of employer’s shipyard; however, it is separated from the working areas by a fence.  It is owned and maintained by employer for use by its employees, Navy personnel, and contractors who have business with employer, and is used solely forRead more

Claimant, a longshoreman who spent all morning and early afternoon consuming beer and whiskey, was injured when he fell over a railing ont a concrete and steel ledge six feet below.  An ambulance took Claimant to the hospital where he was diagnosed with a severe scalp laceration, acute alcohol intoxication with a blood level of 0.22 and cannabis ingestion.  Following two earlier hearings with an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), as well as an earlier appeal to the Benefits Review Board (“Board”), the case returned to the Board following the ALJ’s decision that Claimant’s injury was caused solely by his intoxication.  On appeal, Claimant argued that an “employer must ‘rule out’ all other possible causes of injury before the intoxication defense of Section 3(c) is proven…and that, under this ‘ruling out’ standard, employer did not present substantial evidence to support the [ALJ’s] conclusion that compensation is barred under Section 3(c).” Section 3(c) provides thatRead more