Claimant worked for Employer as a security guard.  During the regular work week, Claimant manned the entry gates.  On weekends, his security rounds happened though Employer’s submarine production areas.  The issue presented was whether Claimant’s security guard/emergency medical technician job constituted marine employment.  Both the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and the Benefits Review Board (“BRB”) held that it did not. Section 2(3) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act provides that “the term ’employee’ means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker . . . .”  See 33 U.S.C. § 902 (1984).  Here, the ALJ determined that Claimant “was not engaged in maritime employment as he was not employed on navigable waters, did not protect cargo, and the non-performance of claimant’s duties would not have impeded employer’s shipbuilding activities.”  The BRB agreed,Read more

Decedent died from mesothelioma.  His employment included Longshore-based jobs.  Following Decedent’s death, his widow requested workers’ compensation benefits under the Washington Industrial Insurance Act (“WIAA”).  Washington’s Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals denied her claim for benefits.  On appeal, the Department of Labor and Industries opposed the widow’s claims.  Specifically, the widow argued that “she is entitled to WIAA benefits because her husband’s last injurious exposure to asbestos occurred when he was employed by a non-maritime employer covered by the WIIA.”  Further, the widow argued that the Department violated Washington law “when it denied her temporary and interim benefits and when it failed to pursue a [Longshore claim] on her behalf.”  The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2, held that the widow’s arguments were only partially correct. State workers’ compensation benefits were not available to the widow “because (1) her husband had worked previously for an LHWCA-covered employer and, thus, [was] notRead more

Plaintiff was employed as a crane operator by Defendant, which was both the vessel owner and the contractor of a crane.  The crane developed an open and obvious hydraulic fluid leak, and Plaintiff complained to supervisors about the leak, which covered areas of the vessel that were within the crane’s swing radius.   Later, Plaintiff slipped on the crane’s tracks, injuring his back.  He blamed the injury on a black spot of hydraulic fluid.   Defendants paid Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) benefits, and Plaintiff then sued Defendant (in its capacity as the vessel owner) for negligence.  The federal district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Defendant had not breached its duties under Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981).  Plaintiff appealed. A dual-capacity employer acts as both employer and vessel owner.  This presents a problem because if the “employer” is negligent, then LHWCA compensation payments are the employee’s exclusive formRead more

During his eleven-year tenure as a ship repair staff supervisor, Mr. Minton was exposed to asbestos.  Sixteen years after his employment ended, he was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, a form of cancer caused by exposure to asbestos.  Minton filed a Section 905(b) claim and the jury awarded him $12,000,000 in compensatory damages, $430,963.70 in medical expenses, plus punitive damages in the amount of $12,500,000 (which was later reduced to $5,000,000). One of the issues on appeal was whether Section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) allows the award of punitive damages.  Although the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized that some courts have allowed punitive damages, it flatly rejected any interpretation of Section 905(b) in favor of punitive damages.  The plain language of the statute limited the remedies available for a negligence action to those included within the terms of the statute.  Because “punitive damages are not a remedyRead more