Plaintiff worked on a ferry boat operated by the State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development. On August 1, 2007, she slipped and sustained injuries while cleaning an oil leak the vessel’s engine room. After Plaintiff filed a Jones Act suit against the State, the State moved for summary judgment on the issue of causation, arguing that Plaintiff’s own negligence was the sole of her injury. In response, Plaintiff filed her own motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, arguing that the State’s vessel was unseaworthy and that the State was negligent in failing to repair the vessel. The trial court agreed with Plaintiff and the State appealed. Louisiana’s Third Circuit first addressed causation. The State argued that Plaintiff could not prove causation because, “while cleaning the oil with soap and water, she herself created the condition which caused her injury.” The Third Circuit recognized that aRead more
Plaintiff-Seaman Can’t Recover Emotional Damages For Witnessing Injury To Someone Else
Plaintiff worked as a vessel repair supervisor at his employer’s shipyard facility. His primary responsibility was the maintenance and repair of Employer’s life boats. He spent roughly 70% of his time aboard those vessels. The other 30% of the time, Plaintiff worked in the shipyard’s fabrication shop or operating a land-based crane. It was during his land-based maintenance duties that Plaintiff was injured by a falling crane that crashed into a nearby building. Plaintiff sustained a broken left foot, a severely broken right foot, and an abdominal hernia. To make matters worse, Plaintiff’s cousin’s husband (another employee at the shipyard) was crushed by the crane and killed. After a three-day trial, a jury concluded that Claimant was a Jones Act seaman, that Employer was negligent, and that Claimant was entitled to $2,400,000 in damages, which included $1,000,000 for past and future mental pain and suffering. Employer appealed, challenging inter aliaRead more
Eleventh Circuit: Seafarer’s Agreement Required Arbitration of Jones Act Claim
Plaintiff, a Honduran citizen, injured his back while working as a mason aboard a Carnival vessel. The injury required surgery and eventually led to “serious orthopedic and neurological problems, including numbness in both legs, difficulty urinating, need for a catheter, sexual dysfunction, and psychological problems.” Plaintiff worked for employer under a Seafarer Agreement. The Agreement included an arbitration clause requiring the arbitration of all disputes (except wage disputes). After his injury, Plaintiff asserted claims of Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and failure to provide adequate maintenance and cure. Acting on a motion to compel arbitration filed by the Defendant, the district court “granted the motion, dismissed as moot all other pending motions, and closed the case for administrative purposes.” Plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which was called upon to answer a jurisdiction question and a substantive question. First, the court addressed the jurisdiction question, which addressed whether the Eleventh CircuitRead more
Alabama: Prior Longshore Settlement Not Determinative of Seaman Status
Purdue and Williams worked as line handlers for a shipping company that provided line-handling services to vessels docking and undocking at various terminals in the Port of Mobile. Much of Purdue’s and Williams’s work was performed dockside, but they sometimes worked on line-handling boats maintained by their employer. On June 19, 2008, while performing their line handler duties aboard one of their employer’s boats, an accident occurred. Purdue and Williams were hooked to an ocean-going tanker when the tanker’s lines began to retract, pulling their 17-foot boat from the water. As a result, Purdue’s and Williams’s boat capsized. Purdue was able to climb to the top of the capsized boat but Williams, who could not swim, drowned. A few months later, Purdue and a representative of the Williams estate filed suit against their employer, as well as Groton Pacific and International Tanker Management (the ocean-going tanker’s managers). They alleged thatRead more
Offshore Sandblaster/Painter was a Jones Act Seaman
Plaintiff worked for a company which performed both onshore and offshore sandblasting and painting. His employer contracted with a third party to undertake the sandblasting and painting of an offshore platform. Plaintiff and his crew worked on this project for two-and-a-half months. During that time, Plaintiff slept and ate on board the M/V Howard McCall, stored equipment on the vessel, and used the vessel as a work platform. Plaintiff was also injured on the vessel: he fell as he was exiting the wheelhouse. After a trial, the jury determined that Plaintiff was a Jones Act seaman, and he awarded maintenance and cure totaling $8,580.00 and $9,754.00 respectively. The first question presented to Louisiana’s Third Circuit was whether Plaintiff was a Jones Act seaman. As for the legal backdrop, the court simply quoted four (4) pages of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368-72 (1995). From there,Read more
Prior Bad Acts Relevant to Damages and Future-Earnings Calculation
Plaintiff suffered serious on-the-job injuries when he fell from a cylindrical cell tower. Thereafter, Plaintiff and his wife sued Plaintiff’s employer, as well as other companies involved in Plaintiff’ work on the day he fell. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict that Plaintiff had not established the facts necessary to recover under the Jones Act, despite incurring nearly eleven million dollars in actual damages. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, Plaintiff complained about the admission of an expert report which contained unflattering facts about Plaintiff’s past, including “extensive prior alcohol, methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana use; a failure to pay child support and termination of his parental rights; numerous arrests for alcohol intoxication, convictions for trafficking methamphetamine, driving while impaired, possession of marijuana, and failure to appear in court; and physical abuse leading to hospitalization.” The Sixth Circuit was satisfied that the expert’s opinionRead more
Permanently Moored Transfer Facility Is Not a “Vessel”
Plaintiff injured his arm while working at the Employer’s “Docksider” facility. The Docksider was constructed as a deck barge in 1972. Twenty-seven years later it was converted to a stationary floating transfer facility. It receives electricity from a generator on shore. Further, the Docksider is held in place by two welded I-beam brackets. It can move vertically to account for the tide and waves, but it cannot transport people or materials. Following his injury, Plaintiff instituted an action against the Employerunder the Jones Act, 42 U.S.C. § 30104, and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). The Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. It determined that the Docksider was not a “vessel” under the Jones Act or the LHWCA. The Docksider’s use for transportation on water was only theoretical. Since 1999, the Docksider has been permanently moored. Considering the fact that Employer doesRead more
Louisiana’s Fourth Circuit Reverses Ruling on Seaman Status
Via a contract with a staffing company, Claimant became employed by a catering company, and was assigned to work as a part of the galley/cooking staff. Claimant alleged that he was injured aboard a vessel while working for the catering company, and he filed Jones Act negligence claims against both parties and their insurers. Subsequently, insurance and indemnification disputes developed between the defendants and their insurers, which were rooted in the issue of whether Claimant was a Jones Act seaman. The trial court, ruling on motions and cross-motions for summary judgment, found that Claimant was a Jones Act seaman, and concluded that the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act was inapplicable; therefore, the catering company was required to defend and indemnify the staffing company. The defendants later settled with Claimant, and a Joint Motion and Order of Dismissal was granted. Appellants now argued that the trial court erred in granting the motions forRead more
W.D. Wash: Loss of Consortium Available in Unseaworthiness Claim
In an opinion that is interpretive of the landmark decision in Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 129 S.Ct. 2561 (2009), U.S. District Judge Pechman denied defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss by holding that the spouse of an injured seaman may seek damages for loss of consortium under general maritime law. Loss of society damages were deemed to be unavailable to survivors of seamen who brought claims under the Jones Act or under general maritime law under Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990). The Miles Court based its holding on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913), which held that loss of society damages were not available under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”). The Miles Court reasoned that the Jones Act, which incorporated the FELA, required the application of the Vreeland decision as judicial “gloss.” Id. atRead more
Jones Act Plaintiff’s 10-Year Old PTSD Claim Was Time-Barred
A pro se plaintiff filed a Jones Act suit against Defendants, Dyncorp International and DynMarine Services of Virginia, complaining of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) stemming from a sexual assault that allegedly occurred over 10 years before she filed her complaint. Plaintiff’s hand-written complaint contained no factual or legal allegations other than two phrases: “Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (sexual assault)” and a demand of “Amount Undecided” for “lost wages, pain & suffering.” In response to Plaintiff’s suit, Defendants filed motions for summary judgment arguing inter alia that her Jones Act claim was time-barred. A claim under the Jones Act must be brought within three years after the cause of action arises. A cause of action under the Jones Act and general maritime law accrues when a plaintiff has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the injury, its cause, and the link between the two. The discovery rule applies such that the statuteRead more